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Abstract In this paper we present the notion of structured reasoning through a
model, called the Generic/Actual Argument Model (GAAM). The model which has
been used as a computational representation for machine modelling of reasoning and
for hybrid combinations of human and machine reasoning can be used as a coales-
cent framework for decision making. Whilst the notion of structuring reasoning is
not new, structured reasoning is advanced as a technique where group consensus on
reasoning structures at various levels can be used to facilitate the comprehension of
complex reasoning particularly where there are multiple perspectives. For an issue, the
approach provides a scaffolding structure for cognitive co-operation and a normative
reasoning structure against which group participants can identify points of difference
and points in common as well as the nature of the differences and similarities. Intra-
group transparency characterized by the ability to recognise points in common and
understand the nature of differences is important to the process of coalescing group
decisions that carry maximum group support.
Keywords Argumentation · Structured reasoning · Practical reasoning ·
Generic arguments · Decision support
1 Introduction
One of the main problems in considering questions of the quality of reasoning (and
decision making) is that, for a long time reasoning was associated with ‘being logical’
and evaluated by the strict criteria of logical formalisms and proof. It was not until
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philosophers studied, in depth the character of human reasoning and looked towards
alternative representations and logics to capture the nature of informal reasoning that
progress has been made in aiding the representation and process of complex reasoning.
The notion of reasoning is closely connected with rationality and the notion of rea-
sons with principles and goals. From the normative logical perspective it is required
that reasoning systems be sound and complete but there are other possible views. In
many instances, reasoning towards action simply requires ‘getting the job done’ as dis-
tinct from having considered a range of possibilities or all possibilities and selected the
best. The logicist approach could be summed up as ‘If it’s sound, do it’ (Doyle 1992).
With this approach, issues of the purpose of the reasoning and the value of beliefs
and inferences to the reasoner are ignored. The heuristic problem solving approach
can also downplay issues of making rational choices unless the heuristics are also
used to compare reasoning methods. In his characterization of the knowledge level
Newell (1982) formulates his fundamental principle of rationality as “If an agent has
knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select
that action.” (Newell 1982, p. 102). Whilst this approach yields solutions it does not
compare the different methods for achieving goals.
The notion of reason is fundamental to reasoning and there has been much written
on reasons (see for example Raz 1990; Hage 1997). Raz for example, argues that rea-
sons are facts but also allows beliefs to be explanatory reasons in the case of reasons
that function as causes and guiding reasons in the case of reasons to act. In our work
we use the term reason as in ‘reason for relevance’ in the sense of a fact or belief that
supports the relevance of an item. We also use the term reason more generally in its
explanatory sense.
Reasoning occurs in a social context and often, particularly when the reasoning
is complex, involves numerous participants with differing views. Normative logical
perspectives are less than helpful because the demonstration of soundness and com-
pleteness of one participant’s view over others rarely occurs. Seldom is evidence
unequivocal and open texture, the notion that empirical concepts cannot be defined
with completeness prior to their use operates against this approach. Similarly, heuris-
tic problem solving typically describes processes used by a participant to formulate a
view and advance assertions that maximize goals but does little to describe or facilitate
the reasoning that occurs between participants.
Innovations advanced here that support reasoning between a group of participants
include an organisation of reasoning that is sufficiently abstract so as to obtain group
consensus on the relevance of all variables without necessitating a commitment by
any participant to particular values on any variable. A group of lawyers discussing
family law can agree that the length of marriage is a relevant consideration that goes
to past contributions for ascertaining the property splits after divorce, without making
a commitment to specific assertions about how long the marriage in a case in question
was.
In this paper we present the notion of structured reasoning as a normative structure
to organise and structure reasoning so that a group of participants can more readily
assert their views and compare and contrast them with others. Structured reasoning
is presented and exemplified through a model, called the Generic/Actual Argument
Model (GAAM) (Yearwood and Stranieri 2006). Structured reasoning is advanced as
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a technique where group consensus on reasoning structures at various levels can be
used to facilitate the comprehension of complex reasoning. This paper puts the notion
of structured reasoning forward as a useful model in which reasoning may be analyzed
but more importantly used to identify points of agreement and points of disagreement
among participants of a reasoning community.
The process of thinking, formulating ideas and making decisions is often ‘spa-
ghetti-like’ or unstructured. Cleaned-up reasoning or explanation might then be what
we call well structured reasoning. Techniques for aiding the structuring of reasoning
may assist not only its final expression but also the process of reasoning. Structured
reasoning as an end product is defined to be a layout of the reasoning possibilities in
a tree structure. Each node in the tree admits a defined range of claims, the root of the
tree is the top level range of claims which is the goal of the reasoning to resolve. The
child nodes of a node are the relevant evidence for reasoning about the parent.
Structured reasoning usually entails: a clearly defined discursive community and
purpose; evaluation of the reasoning that is largely based on acceptance of the agreed
template (version) for reasoning within the discursive community; agreement within
the discursive community on acceptable ways of making inferences within the reason-
ing structure; a demarcation and explicit identification of the context of the reasoning;
the flexibility to combine human with machine inferences; and a shared understanding
of the use of concepts in the domain.
Assessing the quality of reasoning in a structured reasoning framework is not
based on testing conflicting arguments as in Verheij (1999); Gordon and Karacapilidis
(1997); Palmer (1997); Alvarado (1990). Indeed the notion of structured reasoning is
to enhance reasoning by establishing a structure that a community accepts. The qual-
ity of reasoning is judged against the norm of the structure and the acceptance by the
community, not simply on the basis of defeating another argument. Any actual piece
of reasoning selects a path through the structure that can be used to identify agree-
ment, similarity, difference and disagreement. It is this facility that can contribute to
a coalescing of individual reasoning into group decisions.
The motivation for this paper comes from observations of groups of experts with
whom we have undertaken knowledge engineering tasks using the GAAM. It is notice-
able and promising that these experts quickly grasp the particular aspect of the GAAM
that we call structured reasoning and are able to readily contribute to the development
of a structure for reasoning in their domain. For example, although the determination
of refugee status according to a United Nations protocol is widely regarded as com-
plex, discretionary and involving few constraints, members of a refugee tribunal were
readily able to represent the structure of the reasoning divorced from the assertions
in any specific case. Once described, the structure operates as a template to organise
claims made by a party and compare them with claims made by applicant’s for refugee
status, other members and appeal court judges.
The GAAM has been used to model reasoning in copyright law by Stranieri and
Zeleznikow (2001a), predict judicial decisions regarding a property split following
divorce by Stranieri et al. (1999), support refugee status decision makers by Yearwood
and Stranieri (1999), interactive e-commerce by Yearwood et al. (2001), multi-agent
negotiation by Avery et al. (2001), determining eligibility for government funded legal
aid by Stranieri and Zeleznikow (2001b) and modelling reasoning that critical care
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nurses use Stranieri et al. (2004). The computational model is presented in Yearwood
and Stranieri (2006). Two shell programs that implement GAAM ideas are described
in Stranieri and Zeleznikow (2001b) and Yearwood and Stranieri (2002a). In this paper
we concentrate on capturing the notion and benefits of structured reasoning for group
decision making. One of the main concerns of both groups of decision makers and
individual decision makers focusing on similar decisions is that of being consistent.
Section 2 looks at some of the aspects of reasoning that pertain to our discussion
of structured reasoning later. Section 3 discusses notions of structured reasoning and
defines what we mean by structured reasoning. Section 4 provides an outline of argu-
mentation. Section 5 elaborates on the GAAM as a framework for group structured
reasoning. Section 6 briefly reviews some technical aspects of the GAAM. Section 7
discusses the advantages of using a structured reasoning approach. Section 8 details
reasoning with participants using a generic argument structure and Sect. 9 provides
an example of how this contributes to the identification of agreement and difference
and how this can assist in coalescing a group decision.
2 Reasoning
2.1 Practical Reasoning
Practical reasoning is reasoning about what is to be done rather than reasoning about
belief which might be called theoretical reasoning. So practical reasoning entails the
requirements of doing: actions; series of actions; plans - intentions to initiate a sequence
of actions; policies; organizational actions, plans and policies.
Philosophers have been interested in practical reasoning from two points of view:
explanation and guidance. Raz (1990), makes the distinction between explanation and
guidance but from the point of view of decision support systems to support practical
reasoning, we are interested in the general issue of how individuals or groups ratio-
nally arrive at and implement decisions about what to do. It is sometimes difficult to
tell whether a discourse would be classed as guidance or as explanation and Walton
further makes the point that it is difficult to distinguish argument from explanation
Walton (1996a).
Practical reasoning is by its nature domain-dependent and only in clearly defined
and limited domains of decision making would it make sense to use a single approach
to practical reasoning. For example, such a domain is in the medical prescription of
drugs. The factors relevant to such a decision are known and few in number. Fox
and Das (2000) discuss such a decision making scheme and list the factors: efficacy,
side effects, interaction with other drugs being taken, contra indications, patient’s past
experience with the drug, cost, recommendations by the authorities, local policy and
whether a drug is proprietary or generic. This is in contrast to decisions in domains
where the number of relevant factors is not known and where the goals of the decision
may be multiple or conflicting and where knowledge is incomplete or uncertain.
Practical reasoning is complex because of the possible scope of the decisions that
may be addressed but also in the number of types of argumentation schemes that it
may involve. Walton (1996b) lists 25 argumentation schemes which may act as the
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vehicle of practical reasoning to a conclusion about what is to be done. His list of
schemes includes “argument from…”: example, commitment, expert opinion, sign,
position to know, verbal classification and evidence to a hypothesis. Other such lists are
given in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) and Grennan (1997). One argumen-
tation scheme involves weighing the points for and the points against a certain action.
Indeed the application of these schemes represents a particular form of presumptive
reasoning and only gives defeasible support to the courses of action. We say that they
are normally only presumptively valid, in the sense that the schemes do not always
lead to their conclusion when the premises apply. The presumption can be defeated in
the case of there being exceptional circumstances. The ‘critical questions’ associated
with each argumentation scheme serve to direct attention to the conditions that must
be satisfied if the presumption is to stand up.
2.2 Argumentation and Argument Maps
Verbal reasoning, written reasoning and the formalization of reasoning with logic and
even conceptual graph representations have brought us a long way in terms of being
able to deal with complex reasoning tasks. However they still require a considerable
cognitive load for human understanding of the reasoning or a considerable comput-
ing power to carry out the search required to make appropriate inferences. Toulmin’s
(Toulmin 1958) approach was to look at practical reasoning from the point of view
of arguments. He observed that arguments lead not to things that are absolutely true
but more to qualified assertions or defeasible conclusions. He relaxed concerns with
the formalisms of arguments in terms of formal logic involving premises, connectives,
operators and conclusions and focussed on arguments as claims supported probabi-
listically, by data and warrants. The Toulmin structure of arguments will be discussed
in more detail in Sect. 4 but at this stage it is mentioned as the springboard for the
work by Robert Horn (1998) on argument maps1. Argument maps lay out the structure
of arguments in a pictorial or map format. For example Horn has produced a seven
chart map of the long running and complex debate on “Can Computers Think?”. The
maps give a visual representation of the reasoning involved in the debate and allow
an overview of the debate, almost at a glance. They provide a representation of the
reasoning that is pictorial. It is also claimed that the technique can be used to formulate
reasoning and documentation of reasoning within a domain.
Problem Structuring Methods (PSMs) or soft operations research are methods of
tackling problematic situations with uncertainty, complexity and conflict faced by a
group interested in the problem (Rosenhead 1989). PSMs try to elicit the different inter-
pretations of a problem and reflect them back as a whole to the problem owners so that
the richness of the problem may be tackled by all. The richness and complexity of the
problem is a function of the number of individuals in the group. They usually involve a
facilitator in the process of elicitation and reflection. Some PSMs are: Strategic Options
1 Similar work has been done by Yearwood and Stranieri as computational models of reasoning but also
as models to assist in the formulation of human decisions (Yearwood and Stranieri 1999; Stranieri et al.
2001).
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Development and Analysis (SODA); Cognitive Mapping; Soft Systems Methodology
(SSM); Strategic Choice; Robustness Analysis and Dialogue Mapping.
Lin and Shoham (1989) had developed an abstract argumentation system which
contained the definition of an argument as a proof tree although Loui (1987) had
already defined arguments as graphs. Lin and Shoham introduce the important con-
cept of argument structure and show how to use the resulting framework to capture
default reasoning and to formalize inheritance systems. Their aim was the development
of formal systems rather than providing maps of complex reasoning.
A different view of argument is in terms of rules and logic. When a rule supporting
a conclusion may be defeated by new information it is said that such reasoning is
defeasible (Nute 1988). Whenever we chain defeasible reasons to reach a conclusion
we have arguments instead of proofs. Chesnevar et al. (2000) have reviewed logical
models of argument and provide a comprehensive overview of the area.
Walton’s (1996a) book on argument structure presents a new method of argu-
ment diagramming. He defines the concept of reasoning structure, generally as R =
(P, I, F) where P is a finite non-empty set of propositions p1, p2, . . . , pn , I is a finite
set of steps (arcs), i1, i2, . . . , im called inference steps and a function F : I → P × P
which maps each step into an ordered pair (pi , p j ) of propositions. An inference step
is drawn as a directed line from one proposition to another as shown in Fig. 1 where
X,Y, Z and W would be propositions.
Walton discusses in detail the distinction between linked arguments (where the
premises work cooperatively and both are needed, see Fig. 2a) and convergent argu-
ments (where the premises work independently, see Fig. 2b) and strongly puts the
case that there is a third option when it is not known whether the argument is linked
or convergent. He considers it a serious problem with the conventional method of
argument diagramming that the third option cannot be represented. He suggests that
the way out of this, in cases where the evidence is incomplete to judge an argument
as linked or convergent, is through the use of digraphs and numbering the arrows
leading to a common point. In Fig. 1 the two arrows into Z having the same numbers
Fig. 1 A chain of reasoning
Fig. 2 Argument diagrams
(a)
(b)
(c)
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would indicate that both steps are part of the same inference (linked). In contrast, in
Fig. 2c the two arrows have different numbers and would indicate two separate steps
of inference making the reasoning convergent.
2.3 Reasoning Structure
Most approaches to reasoning have been concerned with soundness or with the avoid-
ance of reaching erroneous conclusions, or indeed the strength or force of one line
of reasoning (argument) over another. We argue in this paper that it is also construc-
tive to consider the reasoning community and the framework that they establish as
the basis for representing reasoning on an issue of concern. Our proposed notion of
structured reasoning suggests that reasons are captured as a triple of (factor, position
in the structure, context). The factor captures or is a label for the concept or reason,
the position captures the nexus to other elements (evidence and conclusions) in the
structure and the context captures a whole range of background information. Struc-
tured reasoning entails: first an articulation of generalized propositions (or proposition
slots) and their relation to each other: secondly, the assignment of values (for each
generalized proposition) and agreement on inference procedures that act within this
structure and thirdly the construction of individual actual reasoning to a conclusion
(value) on the issue. The main contribution of this approach is the understanding of
the sources of disagreement or of agreement or similarity that are critical to deciding
on whether consensus can be reached and on providing insight into consistency in
individual reasoning within the reasoning community.
3 Structured Reasoning
We define structured reasoning as an end product, to be a layout or template in a
tree structure into which actual pieces of reasoning fit. Each node in the tree holds
a position for a range of claims, the root of the tree is the top level set of possible
claims which is the goal of the reasoning to resolve. The child nodes of a node in this
structure are the slots for the relevant evidence for reasoning about the parent.
As a process, structured reasoning would involve building or using a tree structure
for a particular domain. Argument maps and concept maps as described above would
provide examples of structured reasoning if the graph is a tree. They do not have the
generality to model a range of different reasoning.
Structured reasoning entails:
– a clearly defined discursive community. For example, applicants for refugee status
and the decision makers (the case of Reff below);
– a clearly defined discursive community purpose. For example to make transparent
decisions on an issue so that differences of opinion between members of the com-
munity can readily be identified and communication about the issue is enhanced;
– evaluation of the reasoning is largely based on acceptance of the reasoning within
the discursive community;
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Fig. 3 From structure to inference
– agreement within the discursive community on acceptable ways of making infer-
ences within the reasoning structure;
– a demarcation and explicit identification of the context of the reasoning;
– the flexibility to combine human with machine inferences;
– a shared understanding of the use of concepts in the domain. This is not necessarily
at the ontic level usually required by concept sharing in an ontology.
A structured reasoning framework is different from an ontology and from a knowl-
edge representation scheme as neither of these entails a discursive community. The
approach facilitates the construction of reasoning that conforms to a normative struc-
ture decided by the community. To this extent it assists in making transparent the ways
that different reasoning is used. The layout of a piece of reasoning is the first level
at which reasoning can be compared and differences between participants’ reasoning
identified. The next level is the inference level and the focus on inferences is relegated
to second position. Figure 3 shows the progression as two major stages, from develop-
ing structure to the development of inferences. Structure development entails a form
of abduction to find the evidential factors that could be used to reason about the issue,
followed by the determination and agreement on how they interrelate and finally the
range of plausible propositions in each factor. Development of inference proceeds in
two stages, the first being the recognition of the form of each inference procedure
from the structuring steps that have preceded and then the acquisition of actual infer-
ences acceptable to the group and reasons (principles or values) that underpin those
inferences.
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Fig. 4 Toulmin argument structure for well founded fear
Whereas ontology is concerned with the articulation of the concepts in a domain and
how they relate to each other, it is not concerned necessarily with reasoning. In struc-
tured reasoning a concept and its place in the structure together define its reasoning
function. Whilst Raz and Hage have defined reasons as facts and beliefs, structured
reasoning suggests that reasons are captured possibly as a triple of (factor, position
in the structure, context). The factor captures or is a label for the concept or reason,
the position captures the nexus to other elements (evidence and conclusions) in the
structure and the context captures a whole range of background information. Struc-
tured reasoning entails first an articulation of generalized propositions (or proposition
slots) and their relation to each other.
A knowledge representation is usually a basis for reasoning that is a formal or semi-
formal representation. The greater the formality, usually, the greater the separation
from a community of users. The success of an underlying knowledge representation
is usually evaluated as its ability to adequately capture the knowledge and the abil-
ity of inference engines to act on the representation in sound ways. In a structured
reasoning framework evaluation of the reasoning is still on the basis of acceptability
by the discursive community. At the same time, however the structure readily enables
evaluation by making the form explicit.
4 Argumentation for Structured Reasoning
Toulmin (1958) concluded that most arguments, regardless of the domain, have a struc-
ture that consists of six basic invariants: claim, data, modality, rebuttal, warrant and
backing. Every argument makes a claim based on some data. The argument in Fig. 4 is
drawn from reasoning regarding refugee status according to the 1951 United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the 1967 United Nations
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees), and relevant High Court of Australia
rulings. The claim of the argument in Fig. 4 is the statement that Reff, an applicant
to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)2 (of Australia) for refugee status, has a well
2 The RRT is the body that considers appeals from applicants refused refugee status by the Department of
Immigration.
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founded fear of persecution. This claim is made on the basis of two data items, that
Reff has a real chance of persecution and that relocation within Reff’s country of
origin is not appropriate. A mechanism is required to act as a justification for why the
claim follows from data. This justification is known as the warrant which is, in Fig. 4,
the statement that ‘The test for well founded fear is real chance of persecution unless
relocation affords protection’. The backing provides authority for the warrant and in
a legal argument is typically a reference to a statute or a precedent case. The rebuttal
component specifies an exception or condition that obviates the claim. Reff may well
have a real chance of persecution and relocation is unlikely however the claim that his
fear is well founded does not hold as Reff’s persecution is due to criminal activities.
Argumentation has been used in knowledge engineering in two distinct ways; with
a focus on the use of argumentation to structure reasoning (i.e. non-dialectical empha-
sis) and with a focus on the use of argumentation to model discourse (i.e. dialectical
emphasis). Dialectical approaches typically automate the construction of an argument
and counter arguments normally with the use of a non-monotonic logic where oper-
ators are defined to implement discursive primitives such as attack, rebut, or accept.
Carbogim et al. (2000) present a comprehensive survey of defeasible argumentation.
In general these approaches include a concept of conflict between arguments and the
notion that some arguments defeat others. Most applications that follow a dialectical
approach represent knowledge as first order predicate clauses, though engage a non-
monotonic logic to allow contradictory clauses. Mechanisms are typically required to
identify implausible arguments and to evaluate the better argument of two or more
plausible ones.
The preference for one argument over others has been modelled in a variety of
ways. Prakken (1993a,b) extends the framework proposed by Poole (1988) by using a
concept of specificity. The claim that a penguin flies because it is a bird and all birds fly
is less specific than the claim that a penguin does not fly. Preference relations between
rules are elicited from experts and explicitly specified in the defeasible reasoning logic
described by Antoniou (1997).
A non-dialectical representation facilitated the organisation of complex legal knowl-
edge for information retrieval by Dick (1987, 1991). She illustrates how relevant cases
for an information retrieval query can be retrieved despite sharing no surface features if
the arguments used in case judgements are represented as Toulmin structures. Marshall
(1989); Ball (1994) and Loui et al. (1997) have built hypertext based computer imple-
mentations that draw on knowledge organised as Toulmin arguments. Hypertext links
connect an argument’s assertions with the warrants, backing and data of the same argu-
ment and also link the data of one argument with the assertion of other arguments. In
this way, complex reasoning can be represented succinctly enabling convenient search
and retrieval of relevant information.
5 The Generic/Actual Argument Model for Structured Reasoning
In trying to acquire and represent knowledge to practically support the tasks of rea-
soning, justifying and document drafting primarily within legal domains we have
modified and generalised the basic Toulmin argument structure. An important aspect
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Fig. 5 Generic argument for well founded fear
of our modification is the principle that most arguments, reasoning or justifications
within these domains can be represented as a set of generic arguments which link
together to form a tree or graph structure. Each generic argument represents a class
of actual arguments that may be made and structurally embodies the components that
go towards shaping well considered decision making in uncertain domains.
The framework called the Generic Actual Argument Model (GAAM) directly facil-
itates the structuring of reasoning as arguments are represented at two levels of abstrac-
tion; the generic and the actual level. The generic level is sufficiently general so as
to represent claims made by all members of a discursive community. All participants
use the same generic arguments to construct, by instantiation, their own actual argu-
ments. The generic arguments represent a detailed layout of arguments acceptable
to all participants whereas the actual arguments capture a participant’s position with
respect to each argument. The actual arguments that one participant advances are more
easily compared with those advanced by another, in a dialectical exercise because, in
both cases the actual arguments have been derived from a generic template that all
participants share.
5.1 Generic Arguments
Figure 5 illustrates the refugee argument above, as a generic argument. The claim
variable has been labelled ‘well founded fear’ and acceptable values specified. There
are three inference procedures known to be appropriate in this example; the first is a
rule set that derives from heuristics an immigration expert uses, the second is a neural
network trained from past cases and the third is a human inference. This latter infer-
ence indicates that a human is empowered with sufficient discretion to infer a claim
value from data item values in any way he or she likes.
A generic argument differs from the Toulmin structure in that it is an abstraction
that models a group of arguments that make related claims. As a consequence a generic
argument includes:
– a variable-value representation for the set of possible claims admitted by the dis-
cursive group. For example the variable well founded fear in Fig. 5 is associated
with values very likely, likely, possibly and unlikely. A certainty slot not illustrated
in the figure is also associated with the claim;
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– a variable-value representation of the data items (with certainty slots) as the grounds
on which such claims are made. A data item of one generic argument is the claim
of another as the arguments interlink to form a tree structure;
– reasons for relevance of the data items in place of the Toulmin warrant;
– a list of inference procedures that may be used to infer a claim value from data
values in place of the warrant;
– reasons for the appropriateness of the inference procedure;
– context variables;
– a claim value reason component.
The data items in each generic argument must be relevant to the claim to the sat-
isfaction of members of the community. A generic argument in a refugee domain
is unlikely to include a data item that refers to an applicant’s eye colour because
a reason for the relevance of eye color to any claim is unlikely to be advanced by
any member of the community. The extent to which a community accommodates all
possible reasons for relevance is a decision of scope to be made by the community.
Some communities will include a data item if any reason for its relevance can be
uttered whereas others will impose stricter conditions for relevance. In law, reasons
for relevance typically derive from statutes or precedent cases. In scientific arguments
factors are deemed relevant by reference to experimental observation or theoretical
perspectives.
Figure 5 illustrates two context variables; the Determining country and the Person
about which the argument is being made. The respective values are a list of world
nations for the Determining Country and the applicant for refugee status, Reff or the
more universal X for the Person. Context variables represent something of the back-
ground knowledge that impacts on the generic argument. For example, the context
variable Determining country in Fig. 5 represents a scope constraint on the argument.
This indicates that an actual argument can be made based on the generic argument
however the determining country sets a context for the argument. The context variable
is an articulation of the presuppositions that underpin the generic argument.
The context variable can also represent the scope of variables used in the generic
argument. For example, the Person context variable will be assigned the value X for a
discourse participant intent on making the more universal argument that relates to well
founded fear of anyone. The participant that restricts the argument to Reff does so by
setting the context variable to Reff. In general, context is a difficult concept to define.
In the framework defined here, context is defined as presupposition and variable scope.
However, other definitions can also be accommodated.
The argument template represents knowledge at a very high level of abstraction.
There are two levels of instantiation made in applying the template to model arguments
within a domain; the generic level and the actual level.
Figure 6 illustrates the Generic Actual Argument Model. Generic arguments exem-
plified by the well founded fear argument in Fig. 5 are interleaved to form a tree of
arguments.
The generic argument is sufficiently general so as to capture the variety of perspec-
tives displayed by members of a discursive community. Actual arguments advanced
by members are instantiations of the generic arguments where:
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Fig. 6 The generic argument template
– claim, data and context variables are assigned values from those specified in the
generic argument;
– a commitment is made to one of the inference procedures listed in the generic
structure;
– claim and data variables are assigned certainty values.
5.1.1 Inference Procedures
In the GAAM, the Toulmin warrant has been translated to the inference procedure, the
reasons for relevance of the data items and the reasons for the inference procedure.
This relates to two different roles a warrant can play in an argument. As described
above, the warrant indicates a reason for the relevance of a data item and on the other
hand the warrant can be interpreted as a rule which, when applied to the data items
leads to a claim inference. An inference procedure is an algorithm or method used to
infer a claim value from data item values. Under this interpretation, an inference pro-
cedure is an operator on data variable values to deliver claim variable values. It is any
procedure that will perform a mapping from data items to claim items. A mathematical
function, an algorithm, a rule set, a neural network, or procedures yet to be discovered
are examples of inference procedures. Many inference procedures can be implemented
in software. Thus, they can be automated in computer based systems. However, this
need not be necessarily the case for a knowledge engineering framework. Claims can
sometimes be inferred from data items by human agents without the explicit speci-
fication of an inference procedure. This occurs frequently in discretionary fields of
law where, as Christie (1986) notes, decision makers weight and combine relevant
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factors in their own way without articulating precisely how claims were inferred. This
situation is accommodated within the Generic Actual Argument framework with the
specification of an inference type labelled, simply, human.
Explicitly representing the inference method enables the use of a variety of infer-
ence procedures. For example, the method used to infer an assertion in the family
law application, Split Up is a rule for some arguments and a neural network for oth-
ers (Stranieri et al. 1999). Branting (2000) provides a framework that captures legal
reasoning using both rules and exemplars. In his framework, rules and exemplars differ
primarily in that exemplars are much less abstract than rules and can be used to provide
a bridge between the abstract rule descriptions and the specific case descriptions. A
knowledge representation framework that separates the inference method from other
components is very flexible. For instance, first order predicate logic draws conclu-
sions solely by the operation of inference rules including modus ponens and modus
tollens. With non-monotonic logics, the repertoire of inference rules is extended but
still tightly embedded into the formalism.
The argumentation framework advanced here not only departs from the Toulmin
formulation by distinguishing inference procedure from reasons for relevance but it
also represents context explicitly. Further, the generic argument does not represent
rebuttal. This is discussed next.
5.1.2 Rebuttal
The rebuttal which occurs in the Toulmin structure is not explicitly represented in the
GAAM and would be captured within this structure as a different instance argument
possibly using a different inference procedure that produces different claim values. The
rebuttal is more clearly classified as a dialectical component and it makes sense that
it is not explicitly represented in this essentially non-dialectical frame. For instance,
discursive participants may create actual arguments as instances of the same generic
argument in ways that are quite different from others. Participant A may assert a
different claim value than B, yet have perfect agreement on all data item values because
a different inference procedure was selected. Any discussion regarding this difference,
including exchanges that make the point that the difference constitutes an attack, or
exchanges that seek to defend A or B’s assertion, or exchanges that seek to identify
the stronger argument involve dialectical exchange and are omitted from this non-
dialectical frame.
It is important to appreciate that the notion of a generic argument can be used to
capture a shared understanding about what a core set of factors and arguments in a
domain are. In some respects there is some similarity to ‘topic theory’ Aristotle (1928),
(Alexy 1989, p. 21) in that an important aspect in constructing each generic argument
is a search for the premises or grounds for that argument. The generic argument rep-
resents the results of this search as the data items articulated and their reasons for
relevance. These are considered to be ‘nearly’ complete knowledge about the possi-
ble grounds for that argument within the group. As such they would include general
exclusionary reasons as described by Raz (1990) which are often the basis for rebut-
tals. Establishing the generic arguments in a domain provides considerable structure
for developing arguments. Engisch (1960) observes that ‘reaching a conclusion as
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such gives rise to a minimum of effort; the main difficulty lies in finding premises for
it’. We argue that establishing the generic arguments in a domain is an effective part
of acquiring, representing, reasoning and providing justification and transparency for
decision making.
Figure 5 also includes certainty slots for each data item, claim and inference pro-
cedure. These recognize that there is uncertainty in the processes of developing actual
arguments. The certainty values are assigned when values are assigned in the process
of constructing an actual argument. A generic argument is an agreed approximation
to a world but still may only be partial knowledge. We do not explicitly put a certainty
or confidence value on a generic argument although we permit generic arguments to
change over time.
The structure of generic arguments that describe a domain will not be static. As
knowledge within the domain evolves new versions of the generic argument structure
will be required. New factors emerge as being relevant to some arguments and new
inference procedures may be needed as new legal rules emerge or new cases become
precedents. Most actual arguments in a domain are then underpinned by a particular
version of the generic argument structure.
The generic arguments within a discursive community or decision making group
can be established by engaging participants in a discussion in the development of the
generic argument structure (GAS) or through their contributions to a common view
of the structure and each participants reasons for relevance (Afshar et al. 2002). The
intention is to have participants agree on a structure for reasoning developed from their
shared understanding. The open textured nature of many areas of reasoning mitigates
against the representation of all arguments in a domain as generic arguments but a
large proportion of arguments in many domains can be represented in this way. It is
also useful to know when particular actual arguments diverge from instantiations of
generic arguments and to detect whether or not they are accepted.
Actual arguments are instances of a generic argument where each data item is
assigned a value and an inference procedure is chosen and executed to deliver a value
for the claim slot. An actual argument corresponds to a position held by a participant
in a discourse. Figure 7 illustrates an actual argument for Reff’s well founded fear
argument with data values set and the particular inference procedure selected is based
on a human myhuman. With human inferencing there is not necessarily a reason for
the inference procedure given at the generic level and there is therefore a need to
justify the claim value produced. This is represented in the diagram as the claim value
reason slot.
The context variable ‘person’ in the generic argument is instantiated to ‘Reff’ indi-
cating that the claim only applies to him and not to others. The data item value in
Fig. 7 represents the situation that ‘Reff is likely to have a well founded fear’.
The claim value reason for this actual argument provides a reason for the specific
claim value inferred rather than other claim values. The claim value reason in Fig. 7
expresses a reason for why well founded fear is likely, given the data items and infer-
ence procedure selected. If an inference procedure that was a rule set was used, then
the rules in this rule set and their appropriateness for reasoning with this data about
this claim could possibly be articulated as justification for the claim value. This is what
would be called deductive justification by Neil MacCormick (1978). The claim value
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Fig. 7 Actual argument for ‘Reff has well founded fear.’
asserted in the figure “likely” needs to be justified and this justification is the claim
value reason which is provided at the stage of making an actual argument rather than
at the generic argument stage. If the inference procedure is a mathematical function
or has mechanisms that are not visible, such as a neural network, then the articulation
of a reason for the inference procedure is not an adequate justification of the value.
Conceptually, it is more correct to say it is a reason for a particular value that has
arisen as a result of the application of an inference procedure.
In the same way that the Generic arguments are chained together to form a Generic
Argument Structure (GAS) an actual argument is a chain of propositions that fits within
the GAS. Agreements, similarities and differences can be identified between two actual
arguments by identifying the position in the structure as well as the inferences chosen.
These then provide the objects for negotiation.
Generic and actual argument structures correspond to a non-dialectical perspective.
They do not directly model an exchange of views between discursive participants but
rather describe assertions made from premises and the way in which multiple claims
are organized. Claim variables are inferred using an inference procedure, which may
not necessarily be automated, from data item values. The reasoning occurs within a
context and the extent to which the data items correspond to true values, according to
the proponent of the argument, is captured by certainty values.
The generic argument provides a level of abstraction that accommodates most
points of view within a discursive community and anticipates the creation of actual
arguments, by participants, as instantiations of a generic argument. However, it is con-
ceivable that, given the open textured nature of reasoning, a participant will seek to
advance an actual argument that is a departure from the generic argument. This is a
manifestation of discretion and can be realized with the introduction of a new variable
(data, claim or context) value, with the use of a new inference procedure or, with a
new claim value reason (Stranieri et al. 2000).
This framework including the Generic/Actual distinction, the clear separation of
inference procedure from other components and the inclusion of reasons for relevance
and context introduces a structure that represents knowledge applicable to a discursive
community.
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Situations will arise where an argument needs to be made for which no generic
argument exists. In these cases, a new argument specific to that situation is created.
Ultimately, the series of actual arguments made in a case is built and represents the full
argument in that situation. Some of the arguments are instances of generic arguments,
others are newly created.
6 Defining the GAAM
The GAAM is a means of specifying generic argument structures to model reasoning
within a domain. For a more detailed treatment see Yearwood and Stranieri (2006).
6.1 A Generic Argument Structure
A generic argument structure (GAS) is a pair (CV,G) where CV is a set of context
variables and G is a connected directed bipartite graph that has two kinds of nodes
called, claim slots C and inference slots I.
Every claim slot C has a prefix C p, set of values Cv and a suffix Cs . Each claim
slot also has two variables. A variable r which is a place holder for the claim value
reason and a variable c which is a place holder for the certainty factor. These are not
instantiated at the generic level but at the actual argument level.
Every inference slot I has an arity (n) and a set of pairs of operators and strings
(I j , J j ) : j = 1, . . . , k.
The number of arcs that belong to I is one more than its arity. An inference slot of
arity n is represented with n inward arcs and one outward arc. Such an inference slot
is called an n-ary inference slot. The set of n + 1 claim slots < C1, . . . , Cn, Cn+1 >
is called the signature of I . The set of n-ary operators is of the form I j : C1v × · · · ×
Cnv × CV V → Cn+1v and each operates on the sets of values of the first n claim
slots in its signature and the set of context variable values. The strings J j store the
justification for the j th operator.
Every arc from a claim slot to an inference slot is a relevance relation pair (Ci , Cn+1)
and has two string attributes, R R and B for the reason for relevance and backing.
There is a unique arc from an inference slot to a claim slot.
A generic argument is a GAS that consists of a single inference slot and the claim
slots that are attached to its arcs. A full GAS can be formed by connecting individual
generic arguments one for each inference slot in G.
An actual argument is an instantiation of a GAS with context variable values, a
choice of inference operator (and reason pair) for the inference slot, the assignment of
claim values, claim value reasons to the claim value reason variables and the assign-
ment of certainty values to the certainty factor variables.
First note that a claim slot Ci defines a set of propositions and the choice of a partic-
ular value Cvk from the set of values Cv defines a proposition (claim): C pCvkCs . The
actual (atomic) argument for this proposition is then represented as being derived by the
application of an inference procedure Ih from the inference slot I (leading to the claim
slot Ci ) to n values (C1vi 1 , . . . , Cnvi n ) and CV V . So, Ih(C1vi 1 , . . . , Cnvi n , CV V ) =
C pCvkCs where C p is the prefix for Ci and Cs the suffix.
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7 Advantages of Structured Reasoning using the GAAM
The GAAM offers a framework for representing, at two levels, the structure of rea-
soning within a domain as well as the reasoning itself. The structure manifests as
a tree whose root is the top level decision that represents the reasoning goal. This
structure has all of the advantages of the Argument maps of Horn (1998) and other
versions of TAS used to represent reasoning in a domain. There are, however some
important distinguishing features that the GAAM presents that allow it to be advanced
as a structured reasoning framework. The first is that it employs the notion of a generic
argument to capture a whole class of reasoning rather than reasoning for a particular
claim. The second is that it distinguishes between the structure of reasoning and how
the reasoning is executed. The third is that the structure of the reasoning is controlled
by the notion of relevance. Lastly the separation of the structure from the execution
allows the execution to be represented as a range of appropriate inference procedures.
The notion of the generic argument to capture a class of argument using a
variable:value representation permits an element of reasoning that parallels
the advantage of the use of predicates over single propositions. It entails the coa-
lescing of many specific arguments into a single generic argument with an inference
procedure to accommodate the variation in evidence and conclusions.
Having the notion of a generic argument as a fundamental reasoning element3 it
is then natural to ask how these elements fit together to make up a piece of practical
reasoning. One part of the task then is to move from a possibly ill-structured or unstruc-
tured task defined as reasoning towards the top level claim. This may be achieved by
identifying an on-going knowledge engineering task that involves the noticing and
evoking mechanism of Simon (1973) which identifies new considerations, constraints
and goals or subgoals. This fitting together of these elements forms the structure that
will finally provide a map of the reasoning about a top level claim within a domain.
The way in which claims within the structure relate to each other is controlled by the
notion of relevance. This is what is commonly referred to as ‘adducing the premises’
except that it is being done in generality for sets of propositions rather than individual
propositions of a dialectical exchange. The effort required by a group to establish
such a generic structure proves to be a sound investment in terms of the quality of the
final decision as well as the group’s satisfaction. This is consistent with findings of
Hirokawa and Pace (1983) on group participation and group systematic approach on
effective decision-making.
Each data item records its reasons for relevance to the claim with backing given
for the reason. As is often the case in employing TAS, the GAAM does not permit
internal reasoning about reasons for relevance or backings (see Marshall et al. 1991).
As mentioned in Sect. 2.1 practical reasoning can be complex because of the num-
ber of argumentation schemes that it may involve. The GAAM framework supports the
representation of multiple individual inference procedures in each generic argument
and so can provide the flexibility to capture many different reasoning mechanisms. In
3 Birnbaum uses the term argument molecule but this is somewhat different from our notion of generic
argument in that it characterizes an argument in terms of a graph of its support and attack relations (Birnbaum
1982).
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Fig. 8 Computational diagram
of a generic argument
concentrating on first representing the structure and then focussing on the inference
from data to claim there is an in-built governance of the notion of mapping from data
that are agreed to directly influence the claim in some way.
As well as constraining the generic argument structure by relevance, the domain
of each inference procedure (a function) is also appropriately constrained. In contrast
to the diagramming technique of Walton, our computational representation of a sin-
gle generic argument is as shown in Fig. 8 where the conclusion set is linked to the
premise sets through an inference slot (a set of inference procedures). This inference
procedure representation avoids the technicalities of the linked/convergent dilemma
at the generic argument level or at least shifts the problem into the inference procedure
slot. The list of inference procedures contained in the inference procedure slot may
provide convergent ways of inferring the generic conclusion. Any particular inference
procedure may be disjunctive in its use of data items or it may be collective in the
use of data items. At the actual argument level the linked/convergent dilemma may
also be avoided by not straying from the generic argument structure. In most cases
the use of the claim value reason may lead to satisfactory justification given that the
structure of the argument has already been captured in a tree structure that will not
permit circularity of argument.
The use of the GAAM as a structured reasoning framework generates an actual piece
of reasoning with an accepted relevant structure that is explicit. The reasoning process
(reasoning step) used at any point can be explained either through the identification
of the inference procedure or the claim value reason.
Dialectical exchanges are constrained to the values that claims may take when
instantiated from generic arguments. This means that the use of structured reasoning
provides a transparent map of the reasoning of each participant or observer of a dis-
course. The use of structured reasoning can facilitate justice by making explicit not
only the agreed reasoning structure that is used within a legal field but also by pre-
senting the actual reasoning within a case in a well structured and explicit form.
The separation of knowledge and inference enables the development of computer
systems to flexibly support human reasoning. Within a mapped out reasoning structure
particular areas can incorporate automatic inferences based on a variety of inference
techniques whilst in other areas inferences can be left to humans.
One of the impediments to the understanding of reasoning as expressed in natural
language prose is not only the difficulty in capturing the structure but the need for
interpretation of concepts and language that is much less constrained. The GAAM
approach overcomes much of this by providing a structure as well as constraining
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the expression to the claims permitted within the GAAM. This creates an arena of
discourse that is more transparent to users. The reasoning expressed in this framework
is clearly enough defined so that artificial agents can understand each other and a con-
sequence of this is that ambiguity is removed from the reasoning that is represented
(see Avery et al. 2001 for details).
To some extent once a generic structure is formulated for a domain the reasoning
performed at any step (within a particular argument) amounts to a choice of the claim
value based on the accepted data values. The logicist approach would argue that a
rational argument would be made on the basis of rules that are consistent and sound.
However, economic rationality may guide the choice of claim values. The GAAM sup-
ports either of these approaches and it would be permissable for an inference procedure
to be specified in terms of sets of preferences of claim values.
8 Group Reasoning using a Generic Argument Structure
Within a community or group a GAS provides a constant reminder of the agreed
upon, shared understanding and interpretative assumptions. Between communities it
provides a public face to the elaboration and explanation as well as the possibility for
encouraging participation.
The GAS can be developed by the group in two ways. Participants to a dialogue can
collectively deliberate on a structure that will suit as the desired normative structure.
Alternatively, a social institution can be charged with the advancement and on-going
maintenance of a GAS. Once a GAS is developed for the group then discourse using
the structure can proceed.
Discursive communities that have no social institution that can be appropriately
charged with the maintenance of a GAS can develop their own GAS. The construc-
tion of the generic argument structure can be carried out through structured dialogue
between GAAMtalk (a Web version of our argumentation tool) Yearwood and Stranieri
(2002b) and participants. The basis of this structured dialogue is the repeated use of a
meta generic argument structure. It sets the structure of reasoning and debate for the
community on the particular matter for deliberation. As a step toward semi-automating
the group construction of a GAS Afshar et al. (2002) describes Consult, a system that
enables a community to engage in a Delphi-like communication and a Borda prefer-
endum vote in order to agree on a generic argument structure.
Once the group has developed a GAS, a dialogue between the participants may
start anywhere in the tree. This can be viewed as a claim, an inference slot or their
actual arguments associated with the claim slot. The object of a dialogue is to identify
whether there is agreement on the claim or where in the associated argument, differ-
ences may be considered for reconciliation. If there is agreement then the dialogue
ends and another dialogue starting at some other point (outside the subtree underneath
the agreed claim) in the GAS can occur. If there is no agreement then the participants
move to exchanges on each of the claims that are the data for the inference slot. If
the claim is a leaf of the GAS then the participants are irreconcilable on data. If they
agree on all of the data items then they may differ on the context variable values and
in this case they are potentially reconcilable through agreement on context variable
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values otherwise they are potentially reconcilable through agreement on inference. If
there are data items that they differ on, then each of these can be used as the starting
point for a new dialogue.
Dialogue involving the use of a generic argument structure involves the following
steps, formally defined as follows:
Define an actual argument A associated with an inference slot I in a GAS G as a
tuple (I j , C1i1 , . . . , Cnin , Cn+1vi n+1).
Within a GAS G the set of points in common from the arguments of two participants
P1 and P2 is the set P I C = {C ∈ C : C P1v = C P2v } and the set of points of difference
is the set P O D = {C ∈ C : C P1v = C P2v }.
Definition A dialogue based on a GAS G is a finite nonempty sequence of moves
where movei = (Playeri , Ci ∈ A) (i > 0), such that:
(1) A ∈ A(G);
(2) Playeri = P1 iff i is odd; and Playeri = P2 iff i is even;
(3) If Playeri = Player1, then A1;
(4) If Playeri = Player2, and C2n+1vk 2 = C
1
n+1vk 1 ,
then P I C = {Cn+1} and P O D = ∅
otherwise C2n+1vk 2 = C
1
n+1vk 1 and P I C = ∅ and P O D = {Cn+1};
So, compare data.
(a) If C1n+1 is a leaf node of G then P1 and P2 are potentially reconcilable on
data.
(b) P I C = ∅ and P O D = ∅. For each Ci ∈ signature(I) ⊂ C, P1 and P2
compare C1i vk 1 and C
2
i vk 2
. If C1i vk 1 = C2i vk 2 then P I C = P I C ∪ {Ci } else
P O D = P O D ∪ {Ci }
(c) If P O D = ∅ then compare context variable value sets, CV V 1 with CV V 2.
If CV V 1 = CV V 2 then P1 and P2 are potentially reconcilable through
agreement on context variable values on Cn+1 of Ai else P1 and P2 are
potentially reconcilable through agreement on inference on Cn+1 of Ai .
(d) If P O D = ∅ then a new dialogue can start for each Ci in P O D.
The dialogue procedure avoids differences that lie in the sub-tree of an agreed
claim. A top level claim is fully discussed when a set of dialogues that covers the GAS
has occurred between participants. We will call this a complete dialogue.
This approach to dialogue suggests a particular approach to decision making which
allows interaction between participants punctuated with deliberation and the possi-
bility of negotiation and revision. It is also flexible in the selection of arguments that
cover the GAS. The procedure can be organised to add claims that participants agree
on to their individual commitment stores (Singh 2000). These claims do not need to
be revisited. The alternative (monolithic) approach would be to have each participant
deliberate and present their complete actual argument that covers the whole GAS.
This has the advantage of enforcing consideration of all items in the GAS as well
as encouraging complete independence of each participant in the discussion on all
arguments in the tree. The former dialogue approach may support less independence
and more interaction in the deliberation and group decision process.
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9 Example
We consider the case of well founded fear for an applicant, Reff, for Refugee status.
The generic argument for well founded fear is shown in Fig. 5. A sample dialogue
between participants X and Y is as follows:
(1) The discussion commences with X and Y accepting to use the generic argument
for well founded fear as a template.
(2) X proposes the actual argument claim that Reff very likely has a well founded
fear of persecution. Y does not believe this. Y believes that it is unlikely that Reff
has a well founded fear of persecution. At this point X and Y have, as their point
of difference, the claim about Reff’s well founded fear.
(3) Y selects a new node to discuss: the node concerning Real Chance of persecution
and proposes that Reff has a real chance of persecution. X agrees that Reff has a
real chance of persecution. This is a Point in Common. Y selects a new node for
discussion.
(4) The other major factor that is used in the determination of well founded fear is
whether relocation is possible for Reff. Y proposes that he believes that Reff can
be very likely relocated. X believes that it is unlikely that Reff can be relocated
so this is a Point of Difference and they are potentially reconcilable on this data
item, Relocation.
(5) X and Y have Relocation as a Point of difference and are potentially reconcilable
on this point. If either X or Y change their claim on relocation this may affect
their inference on well founded fear and the dialogue would continue. Further
discussion would require agreement on the generic argument with Relocation as
its claim node. This generic argument is outside the scope of this paper but would
be treated in a similar fashion.
The discussion has identified numerous points of difference and of agreement for
both parties to deliberate on. The generic argument structure has provided a template to
structure the dialogue without resorting to combative metaphors or unduly constrain-
ing the content or flow of the discourse. From the group decision making perspective
each participant can focus on points of potential reconciliation and the nature of these
can be an aid to achieving a group decision or not.
9.1 Advantages over other approaches
The key technical innovation that the structured reasoning approach has is the sepa-
ration of the structure of the reasoning (defined as the layout of relevant factors) from
inference defined as an operation on data values. The case for the value of setting out
the map of reasoning has been made but the value of separating out the inferences may
not yet be clear. In considering agreement between parties, the separation means that
agreement can only occur if the parties agree on the structure and the inferences. This
is less likely to occur than on the structure alone. So failing to separate the structure
from the inferences means that it is difficult to represent much that a community agrees
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on without recourse to an objective notion of truth (specifying things that every partic-
ipant must agree on). Separating the knowledge and structure from the inferences also
leads to a separation of the decision making task of a group into discussion about the
structure/framework and then discussion within the framework which is more closely
aligned with inference. From a non-dialectical perspective the way in which claims
are laid out and inferred from premises is the object of attention. From the dialectical
perspective within a group, the activities of reasoning can be more readily managed
if governed by an underlying non-dialectical structure.
Approaches based on logic are concerned with the soundness of the reasoning
and this is the norm that is used to evaluate the quality of the reasoning. A struc-
tured reasoning approach goes to some trouble to establish an agreed framework for
reasoning and permits a range of ways of making inferences. The way in which such
a structure is established is described in Yearwood and Stranieri (2002b); Afshar et al.
(2002). The quality of the reasoning can be firstly judged on the extent to which it
adheres to (or departs from) the framework. If it falls within the norm of the framework
then it can be compared with similar or conflicting reasoning from the same evidence.
The extent to which difference in reasoning outcomes is acceptable then rests on the
acceptance of the inference procedures that have been used. At both levels the diver-
gence can be identified and evaluated against the structure and inference procedures
agreed within the framework.
The representation of reasoning in other schemes does not clearly separate the
knowledge and the structure of the reasoning from the inference. For example in a
classical syllogism both knowledge and inferences are propositions. In FOPL, there
are sound inference rules such as modus ponens but there is a mixture of the effect
of clauses. For example, the clause man(Socrates) is not distinguished from
∀(x)man(x) → mortal(x) whereas in the GAAM the latter clause would be distin-
guished as part of the inference procedure. Semantic networks and conceptual graphs
are very similar in their confusion of the two aspects.
Case-based reasoning frequently does not structure the factors in a case and the
knowledge base may comprise a set or a structured collection of cases. The infer-
ence mechanism based on retrieval of similar cases and their adaptation to the current
problem can be viewed as the application of an inference mechanism to the whole set
of cases. The clarity of the reasoning to a large extent depends on the case or cases
selected as the basis for the new reasoning. The knowledge within a domain is captured
as a set of experiences that teach lessons or at least have potential use in reasoning.
Although case-bases are often structured and indexed, this structure and indexing is
often not explicit. Ashley’s (1991) HYPO is an example of a system where a set of
partial matching cases is retrieved and organized into a claim lattice. The cases at the
top of the lattice share most dimensions with the new case. The cases are then clustered
into the most on point cases and potential most on point cases and the case outcomes
associated with each cluster examined before a case is selected for use. Other cases
are also used in the construction of the 3-ply arguments generated. The experiential
knowledge captured by cases can be organized in different ways. It is not clear that an
a priori organization can be achieved that maps domain knowledge and signposts the
cases to be used for reasoning to particular claims.
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Walton’s argument schemes concentrate more on the inference rather than the struc-
ture of the reasoning. Each argument scheme acts to classify a way of reasoning and
highlight critical questions that must be addressed for the reasoning to be valid. They
may act to map critical pathways to reasoning soundly rather than fallaciously but they
do not provide assistance with a framework for premises.
Fallacies can be understood as a consequence of failing to make the distinction
between the structure and the inferences. For example the argumentum ad populum
scheme avoids the consideration of other evidence because the focus is totally on the
efficacy of the inference. Furthermore the scheme only leads to fallacious argument if
we are looking towards universal truth rather than shared understanding.
The argument diagramming technique of Walton and the diagraph approach of
Walton and Batten provide ways of modelling reasoning structure. Walton grapples
with the question of linked and convergent arguments and provides the concept of
a reasoning structure as a graph. The discussion of a reasoning step in this structure
does not go beyond the linked, convergent dilemma. Walton and Batten provide an
approach in terms of a diagraph in which the way that rules are applied is made explicit,
what demonstrations exist and which premises are not needed in finding a demonstra-
tion of an argument. The technique, therefore is able to identify rules, premises and
precedence. It could be used to model reasoning in a similar way to the GAAM but
uses only rules as inference steps. It is not as prescriptive as the GAAM as cycles
are permitted as discussed in Sect. 2. More importantly however, it does not provide
a framework that is reusable. The representation, whilst it provides insight, is at the
actual argument level. As a framework for structured reasoning it has advantages in
that it permits a representation of reasoning patterns that are less directed than the
strong notion of structured reasoning that we have proposed. The technique may have
application in the untangling stage of developing a reasoning tree structure.
In general, the hypertext approaches (Marshall 1989; Ball 1994; Loui et al. 1997),
model the structure of reasoning but do not model the inferences. They permit circular-
ity and their usefulness again is at the level of representing the flow of actual reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning (Kulpa 1994) can encapsulate knowledge and reasoning in
such a tightly coupled way that it provides very efficient and convincing reasoning.
The difficulty is that the production of diagrams of this nature requires very careful
insight.
Bart Verheij’s (1999) ArguMed is an argument assistance system based on the
defeasible logic DEFLOG. The ArguMed system uses the notion of a warranted dia-
lectical argument. A dialectical argument is one in which counterarguments (based
on undercutting exceptions) are incorporated. The system allows warrants, both for
argument steps (the reasons that support conclusions) and for undercutters (for the
exceptions that block the connections between a reason and the conclusion). Step
warrants express that a particular statement can be adduced as a reason for another
statement. Undercutter warrants express that a particular statement provides an excep-
tion that breaks the connection between a reason and conclusion. Whether a dialectical
argument justifies its conclusion depends on the structure of the argument that is on
the reasons, conclusions, exceptions and warrants that occur in it, and on the way they
are related. The system automatically determines the justification status of an argu-
ment. The notions of reason, conclusion, step warrant and reason for a step warrant are
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respectively similar to the GAAM’s notions of data item, claim, inference and reason
for inference procedure. The exceptions, like the Toulmin rebuttal make the argumen-
tation defeasible. The undercutter warrants have no counterpart in Toulmin’s scheme
but would correspond to an inference to a contrary claim at the actual argument level
in the GAAM. Toulmin does not give an explicit characterisation of the justification
status of statements and the GAAM does not necessarily attempt to do this in an abso-
lute sense but relative to the norm of the group’s GAS. This approach is much more
explicit for dialectic exchanges and is free in terms of adducing reasons (backwards)
or inferring conclusions (forwards) but is not as explicit in structuring reasoning. In
the GAAM, adduction takes place at the first stage when the group establishes the
structure then individual inference to conclusions can proceed subsequently within
the structure.
Gordons’s Zeno (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997) and Loui’s Room 5 (Loui et al.
1997) are issue based argumentation systems. Like the GAAM these systems focus
on the justification of an initial central issue. Both of these systems allow reasons to
be chained and a distinction is made between reasons for and against a conclusion. In
Zeno, weighing the conflicting reasons determines which conclusion is justified. Zeno,
like ArguMed allows the determination of the status of statements and arguments by
the system. Neither of these systems assist participants in structuring the reasoning to
the extent that a GAAM based model would.
James Palmer (1997) gives a structural analysis of legal merit arguments. He dem-
onstrates that behind their apparent diversity lies a remarkable uniformity in terms of:
the small number of argument-bites or stock narratives upon which these arguments
are based; and the recurring interrelationships of support and opposition that exists
between them. This structural analysis is useful in its own right and supports the incor-
poration of reasons for relevance in the GAAM. The interrelationships of support and
opposition are not captured within the GAAM but would be captured by a dialectical
model based on the GAAM.
Sergio Alvaradi in developing the system OpEd uses a classification of arguments
into argument units based on relations of support and attack (Alvarado 1990). This
argument unit structure plays a vital part in the understanding of editorial text. He
argues that this structure is domain independent and provides both a computational
and arguably a useful general approach to considering and structuring arguments. The
structuring used in this approach is focused on success or failure in terms of goals and
the possible reasoning of opponents. This is in contrast to our structured reasoning
approach which can be seen as providing a template for domain specific reasoning
structure to be developed collaboratively and in a coalescent manner.
Within the GAAM a generic argument structure is similar to an ontology in that
it represents a shared understanding of the knowledge in that domain. The ontol-
ogy/inference engine distinction is becoming increasingly accepted as seen with the
development of the Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) (Fensel et al. 2000). OIL permits
reasoning using description logic within the ontological specification but is a layer
for inference engines to act on. The separation of the knowledge and the inference
within the GAAM can be viewed similarly but there is not a single inference engine
envisaged. The GAAM permits the use of appropriate inference procedures in each
generic argument.
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9.2 Advantages of the generic structure
The process of developing the generic structure of reasoning in a domain involves arriv-
ing at a tree that experts within the domain agree on. Currently, methods of acquiring
the structure efficiently are being developed (Afshar et al. 2002). Once the structure for
a domain is developed it can change over time. The usual way in which this happens
is through an assimilation of deviant cases. That is through human recognition of a
general need to amend the current structure because of particular new ways in which
cases have been handled. Use of the GAAM framework allows not only the collection
of reasoning instances that build up a large repository of community knowledge but the
possibility of automatically discovering shifts in usage or new patterns of usage. The
data can also be used to update and offer alternative inference procedures or support
mechanisms for human inferences.
The generic structure derives its power from two important elements of abstraction:
the separation of the layout of factors from the inference and the formulation of the
structure in abstract terms that can be instantiated to represent a multitude of actual
arguments. It is this generality that permits the reuse of the structure.
10 Conclusion
The notion of structured reasoning described is based on: the generalised reason-
ing slots described; selecting these based on group consensus of the relevant factors
involved; their inferential relationship to each other; and the possible ways of inferring
particular propositions within these slots.
The GAAM acts as a structured reasoning framework for group decision making
by providing the following features:
– Abstract arguments - providing an effective notion of generic argument that acts
as a fundamental reusable element of reasoning structure.
– Structure based on relevance - providing a framework that represents and maps
the structure of reasoning as a tree which is controlled by the notion of relevance
as determined by the group
– Separation of structure and inference - in the bipartite graph the methods of infer-
ence within a piece of reasoning are separate from the data/claims and together
comprise the structural layout of the reasoning.
– Flexible dialectical support - supports multiple actual arguments that exist within
a group. These can be developed as purely computational reasoning elements, as
computational elements which can be dialectically elaborated or as pure dialectical
elements
The structured reasoning approach develops the task of generating explicit, justifi-
catory reasoning within a domain in four stages:
– Structure development - The mapping out of the generic argument tree as a layout
of the shared understanding by the discursive community of the way in which
generic arguments in the domain fit together based on relevance. This moves the
problem that might be classed as ill-structured to one that is well structured. The
generality of the structure permits reuse.
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– Detailing the claim slot nodes - Capturing the full detail of the claims, values,
reasons for relevance and backings for each generic argument.
– Detailing the inference slots - Determining the inference procedures for each
generic argument and constructing them.
– Actually reasoning - The instantiation of generic arguments with values and pos-
sibly claim value reasons to present an actual piece of reasoning. This reasoning
is then well structured as it fits into the agreed well structured template or map.
Overall, the representation of reasoning and its context can be fully explicit and
transparent in the group/community developed GAS. The GAS then permits a range
of dialectical arguments from group participants and can be used to support group
decision making by allowing participants to identify the basis of their differences
and similarities. The main contribution then is the identification, for participants, of
whether they differ on claims, inferences or contextual information and the exact
nature of their difference. From the computational point of view the structure is like a
heuristic that defines the search space very efficiently. So for groups of software agents
trying to reach a group decision (which may be defined as some form of consensus)
the points to be negotiated become very clear. From the human reasoning view point it
acts in at least two ways: as an explicit structure that scaffolds cognitive co-operation
between group members and as a reference or norm in the same way that a map does.
The focus is not on reasoning as an adversarial exercise but as a cooperative enterprise
where agreements as well as disagreements in complex decisions can be identified
understood and negotiated.
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